Nuclear Energy in Iran
(updated 19 February 2010)
- A large nuclear power plant is nearing completion in Iran.
- The country also has a major program developing uranium enrichment, and this was concealed for many years.
- Iran has not suspended its enrichment-related activities, or its work on heavy water-related projects, as required by the UN Security Council.
Iran produced 201 billion kWh gross in 2006 from 31 GWe of plant, giving per capita consumption of 1943 kWh/yr. 74% of its electricity comes from gas, 17% from oil, both of which it has in abundance, and 9% from hydro.
Nuclear power developments
In 1957 a civil nuclear program was established under the US Atoms for Peace program.
In 1974 the Shah announced a target of 23,000 MWe of nuclear capacity to free up oil and gas for export.
In 1975 construction of two 1,200 MWe PWR units was started at Bushehr on the Persian Gulf by Siemens KWU. After the Islamic revolution, payment was withheld and work was abandoned early in 1979 with unit 1 substantially complete and unit two about half complete. The plant was damaged by Iraqi air strikes in 1984-88.
The Islamic Republic of Iran revived the nuclear power program in 1991 with a bilateral agreement with China for the supply of two 300 MW(e) PWR units of Chinese design, similar to the Qinshan power plant, but nothing eventuated.
In 1994, Russia's Minatom and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) agreed to complete unit 1 of Bushehr nuclear power plant with a VVER-1000 unit, using mostly the infrastructure already in place. However, this necessitated major changes, including fabrication of all the reactor components in Russia under a construction contract with Atomstroyexport. This 915 MWe plant, being constructed by Atomstroyexport, is expected to start up in 2009, with commercial operation in 2010. All work has been under IAEA safeguards and operation will also be under safeguards.
After two years delay due to Iran's reluctance to agree to returning used fuel to Russia without being paid for it, two agreements were signed early in 2005 covering both supply of fresh fuel for the new Bushehr nuclear reactor and its return to Russia after use. The Russian agreement means that Iran's nuclear fuel supply is secured for the foreseeable future, removing any justification for enrichment locally.
Russia's Atomstroyexport by the end of January 2008 had delivered the 163 fuel assemblies for the initial core of Bushehr plus 17 reserve ones - 82 tonnes of fuel in total. The fuel is enriched 1.6% to 3.62% and is under full international safeguards. The Russian government had withheld supply as negotiations over Iran's uranium enrichment activities proceeded. As of September 2009 the reactor was reported to be 96% complete and testing had begun earlier in the year. Fuel loading is expected by October, with first power soon after. The preliminary agreement states that the first reactor of Bushehr nuclear power plant will be operated by the Russian-Iranian joint venture during the one-year warranty period.
The anticipated 7 TWh/yr from the new reactor will free up about 1.6 million tonnes of oil (11 million barrels) or 1800 million cubic metres of gas per year, which can be exported for hard currency.
Despite high-profile and serious disagreements with IAEA over uranium enrichment, the IAEA continues full involvement with Iran on nuclear safety issues, focused on Bushehr.
The AEOI originally said that construction of unit 2 at Bushehr was to proceed and that feasibility studies for a further 5000 MWe had been ordered. However in December 2008 it announced that the next step would be two new 1000 MWe plants nearby, with Bushehr unit 2 shelved.
The Nuclear Power Production & Development Company of Iran (NPPD), closely associated with AEOI, had invited bids in 2007 to construct two large third-generation PWR nuclear reactors - 1000 to 1600 MWe each - near Bushehr, to come on line about 2016. It is not known whether any bids were received.
In May 2007 the AEOI said it was planning to build an indigenous 360 MWe light water reactor at Darkhovin in Khuzestan province in the southwest, at the head of the Gulf. Two Framatome 900 MWe plants were about to be constructed here in 1970s. The head of NPPD denied that these would use Chinese technology and in October 2008 announced that their design would begin shortly and be completed in six years. The IAEA has requested, but not been given, design information on this proposed plant.
Uranium enrichment
Iran has a major project developing uranium enrichment capability. This program is heavily censured by the UN, since no commercial purpose is evident.
The antecedents of this go back to 1974, when Iran loaned $1.18 billion to the French Atomic Energy Commission to build the multinational Eurodif enrichment plant at Tricastin, and it secured a 10% equity in the enterprise, entitling it to 10% of output. The loan was repaid with interest in 1991 but the plant has never delivered any enriched uranium to Iran since the new government in 1979 cancelled its agreements with Eurodif and ceased payments to it. But in 1991 Iran revived its nuclear power ambitions and demanded delivery of its share of uranium under original contract, but this was refused by France due to political sanctions then being in force. Iran views this refusal as proof of the unreliability of outside nuclear supplies and cites the Eurodif experience as the basis for achieving energy independence by developing all of the elements of the nuclear fuel cycle itself. The AEOI still holds the 10% share in Eurodif. The 10.8 million SWU plant operated by Areva started production in 1979 and is due to close soon after 2010.
In about 2000 Iran started building at Natanz, 80 km southeast of Qom, a sophisticated enrichment plant, which it declared to IAEA only after it was identified in 2002 by a dissident group. This is known as the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), but also at Natanz a large underground Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) is being developed. Operations at the PFEP, FEP and the uranium conversion plant (UCF) are under international safeguards, though monitoring is constrained. To early February 2010, environmental samples confirmed that both enrichment plants were operating as declared, producing less than 5.0% enrichment. However, in February 2010 about 1950 kg of low-enriched uranium from FEP was taken to PFEP and some was fed into the one cascade there capable of enriching to 20%. Some 19.8% enriched uranium was produced, apparently for the Teheran Research Reactor.
In June 2006 the PFEP at Natanz was operating a 164-centrifuge IR-1 cascade commissioned in March which had produced 3.6% enriched material. Two other cascades were being installed, IR-2 and IR-3, and a 10-machine IR-4 cascade followed by mid 2009. To mid August 2009 about 140 kg of UF6 had been fed into various cascades of four types, producing uranium enriched to less than 5%. However, in February 2010 about 1950 kg of low-enriched UF6 was moved from FEP and some of it was enriched to almost 20% in one cascade at PFEP.
At the main FEP at Natanz, production hall A is being set up with eight units (A24-A28 initially, A21-A23 later), each of 18 cascades with 164 IR-1 centrifuges – total 2952 each unit. At the end of January 2010 the IAEA reported that 3772 centrifuges were operating, over two tonnes of UF6 had been fed into FEP, and 2065 kg of low-enriched uranium hexafluoride (3.5% U-235) had been produced. The target capacity is said to be 54,000 centrifuges.
At FEP these are all P1 centrifuges (the design having come from Pakistan), now designated IR-1. Iran is undertaking R&D on a variant of the more advanced P2 design. At the Natanz PFEP a few new design centrifuges designated IR-2, IR-3 and IR-4 are installed, with increased rates of enrichment being achieved with IR-2 in 2008.
In September 2009 Iran told the IAEA that it was building another enrichment plant, but gave no details. This is the Fordow plant (FFEP), about 20 km north of Qom, in an underground tunnel complex on a military base. It is designed to have 16 cascades of about 3000 centrifuges of IR-1 type and is reported to be under the control of AEOI. Evidently construction began in 2006, and it is expected to be operational in 2011. The IAEA inspected it late in October 2009.
Uranium Resources and Mining
In the early 1980s Iran purchased 450 tonnes of uranium (531 t U3O8) from South Africa. Some 366 t of this was subsequently converted to UF6 at Esfahan. This is the main, or possibly the only, material being used in Iran's enrichment plants.
Iran has very small reported uranium resources, about half as reasonably assured and half as inferred resources. It is reported to have significant levels of molybdenum and other impurities which create difficulties in enrichment. AEOI is responsible for uranium mining and treatment.
There is some underground mine development at Saghand in the central desert region, and in June 2009 the IAEA reported "ore recovery activities" there. Resources of 900 tU at 0.055% U are quoted. The associated Ardakan mill about 75 km from Saghand was expected to produce 50 t/yr of uranium oxide from early in 2009, but it appears to be still under construction.
The main mining and milling is at Gchine or Gachin, near the port of Bandar Abbas on the Persian Gulf. The ore is in surficial salt plugs at 0.20 %U grade. The Bandar Abbas Uranium Production Plant (BUPP) began production in 2006, and operations continue.
Other parts of fuel cycle, R&D
A uranium conversion plant (UCF) at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Centre has 200 t/yr capacity and started up in 2004. It is under IAEA safeguards and the IAEA reported that to February 2009 it had produced 366 tU as UF6, ie 541 tonnes of UF6.
The Teheran Nuclear Research Centre was established in 1967 by the AEOI. It has a US-supplied 5 MW pool-type research reactor which has operated since about 1967. The IAEA monitors the Teheran Research Reactor (TRR) and also a Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope production facility (MIX). Since being converted from 93% HEU about 1988 by Argentinian specialists, the TRR runs on 19.75% enriched uranium, and 116 kg of this was supplied from Argentina about 1993 - enough for 10-20 years depending on how the reactor is operated. This had nearly run out in 2009. The presence of molybdenum in Iranian UF6 means that domestic supplies may be unsuitable at this level of enrichment.
In 2009 it seemed likely that Russia might provide some further uranium for TRR fuel blended down from 36% enriched material and fabricated in France, in exchange for an equivalent amount of its own (< 5%) enriched uranium from Natanz. This was rejected by Iran, which then tabled a revised version. At issue was the amount of Iran's uranium stockpile to be handed over at one time. The international negotiators wanted to do this exchange in one large shipment, while Iran preferred several smaller swaps which maintained more of its overall holding for a longer period. In February 2010 the government ordered the AEOI to commence enriching Iranian uranium to 19.75%. It is not clear whether the Isfahan fuel fabrication plant can make fuel elements for TRR.
The Nuclear Technology Center of Isfahan operates four small nuclear research reactors, all supplied by China. It is run by the AEOI.
Iran is also building a 40 MW heavy water-moderated "research" reactor at Arak fuelled by natural uranium. The IR-40 design is very similar to those used by India and Israel to make plutonium for nuclear weapons, and was apparently designed by Russia's NIKIET. Construction is under way and the incomplete plant was "inaugurated" in August 2006. In August 2009 it was about 63% complete, with the reactor vessel due to be installed in 2011. It is to replace the old Teheran reactor. Iran has said that it will be under IAEA safeguards. A heavy water production plant has already been in operation at Arak, but the IAEA is denied access to it.
A fuel manufacturing plant has been constructed at Isfahan to serve the IR-40 reactor and possibly Bushehr. In May 2009 the IAEA noted that fuel rods were being produced and that an initial fuel assembly for IR-40 had been produced from these.
Non-proliferation
Iran joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1974. It has signed the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA but has not ratified it.
All Iran's facilities, except the Kalaye plant and the Arak heavy water plant, were under IAEA safeguards as of mid 2003. Details are in the Director-General's report to the IAEA Board of 6 June and 9 September 2003, and subsequent reports such as those to 23 May and 15 November 2007 on IAEA web site.
Iran originally attracted world attention in 2002 when some previously undeclared nuclear facilities became the subject of IAEA inquiry. On investigation, the IAEA found inconsistencies in Iran's declarations to the Agency and raised questions as to whether Iran was in violation of its safeguards agreement, as a signatory of the NPT.
An IAEA report in November 2003 showed that Iran had, in a series of contraventions of its safeguards agreement over 22 years, systematically concealed its development of key techniques which are capable of use for nuclear weapons. In particular, that uranium enrichment and plutonium separation from used fuel were carried out on a laboratory scale. Iran admitted to the activities but said they were trivial.
In August 2005 the IAEA Board called upon Iran to suspend work associated with uranium enrichment. In March 2006 the IAEA referred the issue to the UN Security Council. However Iran has not backed off from its activities in developing uranium enrichment.
On 24 March 2007 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution imposing further sanctions on Iran and reaffirming that Iran must take the steps required by the IAEA Board, notably to suspend its uranium enrichment activities. The IAEA reported in May 2007 that Iran had ceased providing information required under the Additional Protocol.
The IAEA stated clearly in November 2007 and since that unless the Additional Protocol was ratified and in place it is not possible for the Agency to establish that undeclared nuclear materials and activities are absent. Its "knowledge about Iran's current nuclear program is diminishing." Meanwhile enrichment continues, the existence of the underground and undeclared Qom plant has come to light, and hence a third UN Security Council resolution is likely.
The Iran situation has revived wider concerns about which countries should develop facilities with high proliferation significance - such as enrichment and reprocessing, even under safeguards if there is no evident economic rationale. At some point in the future, such a country could give three months notice of withdrawal from the NPT and reconfigure its facilities for weapons production. The USA asserts that Iran has been in fact developing just such a breakout capability.
This contention was supported in February 2010 when the government ordered the AEOI to commence enriching Iranian uranium to 19.75% for the Teheran Research Reactor (TRR), thereby significantly closing the gap between its normal low-enriched material and weapons-grade uranium. The 1950 kg of low-enriched uranium (< 5%) moved to PFEP would be enough for vastly more 19.75% enriched uranium than the TRR could conceivably use.
See also Nuclear Proliferation Case Studies paper.
Main References:
OECD NEA & IAEA, 2006, Uranium 2005: Resources, Production and Demand
IAEA web site, particularly Iran section
AEOI
Institute for Science & International Security, 2009, Nuclear Iran: not inevitable; Jan 2009.
Institute for Science & International Security, 2010, IAEA Iran Report, 18 Feb 2010.
ISIS Nuclear Iran web site
參考來源:World Nuclear Association
